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Abstract.  Traditional Department of Defense (DoD) practices in the acquisition of space systems have focused on
advanced versions of proven technology, meaning large satellites.  This paradigm contributes to dependence on a
handful of satellites, program schedules measured in decades, and the expensive oversight and program
management functions which must be applied to systems which, since there are so few assets, cannot countenance
failures. The escape from this paradigm is offered by Microsatellites (Microsats).  Microsats are not only useful
technology, but technology which enables a different approach to acquisition.  What the authors call the  Microsat
Acquisition Paradigm (MAP) is partly modeled on NASA’s “Faster, Better, Cheaper” approach and takes lessons
from NASA’s successes and failures. Now that some space functions can be undertaken by low-cost Microsats, the
advantages of mass production, reduced government oversight, and acceptance of a reasonable failure rate can be
applied to space system acquisition.  This paper explores the three pillars of the MAP approach: requirements,
technology, and acquisition, which together support the Holy Grail of space system affordability.  Understanding
the military’s space requirements is the first pillar of this approach.  The second pillar is the ability to correlate the
requirements to the current and projected state of Microsat technology and explain what space functions can be
accomplished with Microsats. Finally, historical examples, as well as recent studies. demonstrate that streamlined,
cost-effective acquisition is a reality for Microsats, enabling savings in time and money compared to the acquisition
system used for traditional space systems.
Introduction
The U.S. government has been purchasing space
systems from contractors for over four decades.  In this
time, the cost has only increased, the time to purchase
space systems has multiplied manyfold, and the
Government’s satisfaction with its purchases has, if
anything, declined.  Current acquisition reform efforts,
while welcome, have not solved this problem.
________
Copyright 2000 by the authors.  Published by the
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
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It is vital, in this era of expanding needs and
contracting budgets, to examine how we purchase
 systems and how a new model of space system
acquisition can reduce costs and timelines while
in reasing satisfaction.  This paper makes the case for
the Microsat Acquisition Paradigm (MAP).  Through
analysis of requirements, technology, and acquisition,
the MAP leads to a proper examination of Microsats as
solutions and to applying lessons from Microsat
programs to space systems in general. (Figure 1)
For purposes of this paper, a Microsat is a single-
purpose satellite, normally but not exclusively under
100 kilograms (kg) in total mass.
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The MAP rests on three pillars: Requirements,
Technology, and Acquisition.  To understand all these,
we much first take a quick look at the historical record
for military Microsats and the reasons why lessons
drawn from Microsat programs are relevant and
important.
Figure 1.  Microsat Acquisition Paradigm
Historical Background
Every era since the Space Age began in 1957 has
produced fluctuations in the preferred method of
developing and acquiring space systems.  As the
military uses of space have expanded, DoD has sought
to develop ever-increasing space capabilities.  Most
often, these come in the form of enlarging and adding
capability to past satellite designs and/or technology.
The idea of using Microsats for military missions is
not new.  Many of the first U.S. military satellites were
Mi rosats.  In the early 1960s, Microsats provided the
first military communications systems, the first missile
w rning system, and performed a host of other military
functions, some of them still classified.
As boosters became more powerful from the late
1960s on, the U.S. military chose to orbit increasingly
larger and more capable payloads. In the decade from
1978 to 1987, for example, only six military Microsats
were launched.  Beginning in 1987, the Defense
Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) led a
resurgence of interest  which resulted in such satellites
as GLOMR, MACSAT, DARPASAT, LOSAT-X, and
the MicroSat constellation. (Table 1)
When the Persian Gulf crisis began in the summer of
1990, DARPA's 68-kg Multiple Access
Communication Satellite (MACSAT) was being tested
in orbit.   The MACSAT was pressed into operational
service and assigned to the exclusive use of a squadron
of the 2nd Marine Air Wing.  Throughout  Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, the squadron used the
MACSAT to exchange logistics information, such as
supply orders, with its U.S. headquarters.
Despite the success of the MACSAT and other
Microsats, however, the military did not rush to put
more Microsats into service.  In 1992, Congress
deleted funds for a Navy program to orbit six
MACSAT-based Arcticsat UHF relay Microsats.1
While military Microsats performing operational
missions are still rare, R&D use has continued, and
several innovative missions are pending.  Notable
among these are two projects backed by the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL): the XSS-10 space
inspection Microsat and the pathfinder mission for the
TechSat-21 radar sensing constellation.
Why Consider Microsats?
Microsats offer a wide range of capabilities.  It must be
admitted up front that Microsats also have certain
limitations.  In communications, for example,
Microsats have limited data transmission capabilities
compared to largesats.  To make them equivalent, one
would have to downsize a largesat’s entire
communications payload (at high R&D cost) or keep
the Microsats simpler and make more use of ground
processing or existing communications relay pipes like
the NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellites.  The
increased use of ground-based support systems is the
approach taken by most Microsat programs.
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In Microsats’ favor, they offer lower total mission
costs than largesats and can be built and launched
more quickly.  In some mission scenarios, especially
those where on-orbit capacity must be added or
replaced rapidly, these characteristics make Microsats
well worth considering as part of the military space
fleet.
TABLE 1.  Selected Military Microsatellites
Selected Military-Related Smallsats and
Microsats
NAME YEAR MASS
 (kg)
PRIMARY
PAYLOAD
U.S.
GLOMR 1985 52 Comm
MACSAT* 1990 68 Comm
REX 1990 50 Comm
SECS 1990 25 Comm
MicroSats
 (7 satellites)
1990 23 (each)Comm
LOSAT-X 1991 75 Sensing
MSTI-1 1992 150 IR Sensing
RADCAL 1993 90 Radar
Calibration
MSTI-2 1994 169 IR Sensing
REX-II 1996 110 Radiation
Sensing
FORTE 1997 215 RF Sensing
MightySat I 1998 68 Technology
Testing
TSX-5 2000 115 Technology
Testing
MightySat II.12000 140 Imagery
XSS-10 2001 25 Satellite
Inspection
FOREIGN
CERISE
(France)
1995 50 ELINT
OFEQ-3
 (Israel)
1995 189 Imagery
Clementine*
(France)
1999 50 ELINT
* NOTES:
 - 2 MACSATs were launched: one failed due to 
operator error.
 - France’s Clementine satellite has no relationship to
to the U.S. Clementine program.
To provide a comparison in one mission area –
communications satellites - it would cost
approximately $38 million (M) to buy eight
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Orbcomm
UHF/VHF comsats and launch them using a Pegasus
lau ch vehicle. Eight Orbcomms would provide
continuous or near-continuous coverage of a theater of
operations.2  (NOTE: All costs in this paper, unless
otherwise identified, are in Base Year 2000 (BY00)
d ll r .)  In contrast, the average unit cost of a single
UFO satellite, designed to handle UHF
communications from geosynchronous orbit,  is
$212M.3
A UFO has much greater capacity than an eight-
Orbcomm constellation and carries voice traffic, which
the Orbcomms do not.  If the UFO fails, however, its
entire capacity is lost and will take months or years to
replace, at a cost similar to the original.  In a war, that
kind of time may not be available.  The ability to
quickly and affordably replace even a fraction of lost
capacity could be crucial.   The satellite assembly line
at Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) turns out a
batch of eight Orbcomms every three months, and the
same company’s Pegasus assembly line averages one
launch vehicle produced every one and a half months.
Both Orbcomm and Pegasus are designed for
storability and rapid checkout and launch.  By
comparison, a UFO takes 12-18 months for satellite
construction alone.4
In addition to the shorter manufacturing timeline, the
relative simplicity of Microsats enables them to be
stored ready for launch much more cheaply and easily
than largesats.  This capability for responsiveness is
not only an advantage compared to largesats, but
offsets the potential vulnerability created by the fact
that Microsats most often operate at LEO altitudes
which could be more susceptible to antisatellite
(ASAT) systems.
Wertz and Larsen's book Reducing Space Mission Cost
offers an instructive comparison between the costs of
four missions estimated using standard spacecraft
development approaches and parametric costs vs. what
actually happened when the missions were done using
the smallest possible spacecraft and a MAP-like
approach. (Note that most of the spacecraft shown in
Table 2 are larger than the 100-kg guideline mentioned
early in this paper, making the point that a Microsat is
more a matter of design philosophy than of an arbitrary
size limit.) Clementine in particular was a fairly
complex spacecraft, but cost two-thirds less than a
comparable largesat and took only 22 months to build
and launch using a streamlined acquisition and
development approach.
From an acquisition standpoint, the more complex
system (a largesat) needs a much larger effort by the
Government in supervision, management, and
paperwork.  One military space official explained,
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"Big satellites carry multiple payloads.  The mass of
the interface control documents exceeds that of the
spacecraft and approaches the weight of the launch
vehicle."5
Table 2.  Spacecraft cost comparisons
(All figures FY95$M)6
Spacecraft Expected CostActual Cost
Orbcomm (2 (2
prototypes, each
33 kg)
375.8 15.7
RADCAL
(radar testing,
 92 kg)
112.7 16.6
AMSAT
OSCAR-13
(communications,
140 kg)
127.4 1.24
Freja
(magnetospheric
 research, 256 kg)
271.2 24.5
Clementine
(BMDO test
and lunar science,
232 kg (dry))
233.9 85
NOTE: All missions include launch costs.  All except
RADCAL include first-year operations costs.
It  is a fact that large spacecraft require large,
expensive launch vehicles.  This leads to a natural
desire to make full use of every kilogram of payload
capability.  Spacecraft designers, squeezed between
the need to minimize weight and the requirements for
redundancy, space-qualified parts, and other standard
rules, make it work by designing unique structures,
one-of-a-kind components, and very little design
margin.7  The result is incredibly expensive spacecraft.
Microsat designers, paradoxically, focus less on
squeezing the most out of the available payload
capacity and more on hefty design margins, overbuilt
structures, and proven (though rarely space-qualified)
components.  All these are made possible by the focus
on using the simplest possible spacecraft for the job
and relying on functional or system-level redundancy.
(Functional redundancy is the capability of one part to
do the job of another, such as using a horizon sensor to
adequately, if not perfectly, replace a damaged star
tracker.)  The need for expensive launchers for large
satellites also means there are very few launches,
leading to even more costs as designers try to cram
more functions onto the handful of spacecraft that will
actually get launched.
The 1994 Air University study Spacecast 2020, in a
section titled “Rapid Space Force Reconstitution,”
made another point.  If a large satellite has a nominal
10-year life and a Microsat two years, the Microsats
are able to go through five generations of technology
improvement for every one generation of the largesat.8
It should be noted that Microsats do not have t  have
short life spans: the design life of an Orbcomm is eight
years.9  There are tradeoffs between updating
technology and the added costs of launching waves of
shorter-lived satellites, but a Microsat approach at least
provides the flexibility to examine that tradespace.
Large satellites do not.
It is highly significant that all three of the major space-
related forecasts accomplished in recent years by the
Air Force - New World Vistas, Spacecast 2020, and Air
Force 2025 -  endorsed development and use of
Microsats for some military missions.10
In New World Vistas, the Air Force’s Scientific
Advisory Board made the following points about the
Air Force’s future space systems:
· To hold down costs, single- or dual-purpose
satellites should be the rule.
· Time from design start to launch should be held to
two years to reduce cost creep and allow for
maximum practical infusion of new technology.
· Advances in computers, sensors, and materials
will enable large constellations of small satellites
to be integrated for global, real-time sensor and
communications coverage.
· Future spacecraft should be inexpensive, mass-
produced, networked with other space assets, and
highly autonomous.11
Spacecast 2020, mentioned earlier, recommended the
use of small satellites combined with rapid-response
launch  vehicles to provide a timely reconstitution
cap bility.
The Spacenet section of Air Force 2025, which
des ribes the future on-orbit C3 system, states,
“Design goals in 2025 may move toward distributed
small Microsatellite systems, reusable Microsat
systems, or disposable Microsat systems, as well as
retaining some large, maximum-longevity space
systems.”12  The report noted that Microsat technology
in 1996 was immature, but suggested that the cost of
future Microsats could be measured in thousands of
doll rs.  “Throwaway” Microsats could be launched on
need and discarded after a crisis.
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The magnitude of the cost and size increases in
military satellites is most evident in the military
satellite communications (MILSATCOM) field.  The
Initial Defense Satellite Communications Program,
first launched in 1966, used low Earth orbit (LEO)
satellites with limited capabilities.  As an Aerospace
Corporation reference explains it,
"The basic design principle for IDSCP was
simplicity.  By using spin-stabilized satellites
in subsynchronous orbits, neither
stationkeeping nor active attitude control was
required.  The random nature of the individual
satellite orbits provided automatic replacement
of failed satellites with acceptable outages.  No
command system was used because of
previous experiences (with failures).  Each
satellite had two TWTs (traveling wave tube
amplifiers), and an onboard sensor switched
from one to the other upon detecting a failure.
The two TWTs were of different designs to
reduce the chance of a common failure
mode."13
The 45-kg IDSCP satellites had a threshold life of one
and a half years, and had a built-in device to turn them
off after six years.  Several satellites operated far
beyond these lifetimes, and satellites launched in 1968
remained in service in 1976.  (It should be noted that
one criticism of this system was the low production
and relative unreliability of the power systems then
available which could fit on such a small satellite.
However, battery and solar-cell technology has
improved immensely since 1966.  The improving state
of technology is important to keep in mind whenever
historical examples of Microsats are considered.)
The IDSCP system was later renamed Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) I.  DSCS II
and III steadily increased the size, capability, and cost
of the MILSATCOM platforms.  Today’s UHF
Follow-On (UFO) satellites weigh 3015 kg and cost
$212M each, while the MILSTAR satellites weigh
4500 kg and has a unit cost of $808M. (The MILSTAR
figure is the cost af er the program managers claim to
have saved a total of $606M through performance
trades and improved acquisition procedures.)14  In
essence, complexity costs!
We have purchased greatly increased capability for
this added size and cost.  However, it is appropriate to
examine the total price paid for this complexity, and
how this is intertwined with the approach taken to
spacecraft acquisition.
Current Acquisition Approach
In the last few years, it became apparent that efforts to
root out fraud and waste in contracts cost, in some
cases, more than they were worth, thanks to the layers
of bureaucracy these efforts added.  Recent acquisition
reform efforts have emphasized  reduced oversight,
Government-contractor teaming, and increased
contractor responsibility.  These efforts have improved
the acquisition process for space systems, but have not
created the kind of fundamental paradigm shift sought
in the MAP.   Acquisition practices still add
considerable cost to military space systems.
Many examples of current acquisition practices are
combined in the templates built into one of DoD’s
standard cost estimating systems, Automated Cost
Estimating Integrated Tools (ACEIT). ACEIT can take
the estimated hardware cost of a system, plus the
anticipated development and acquisition schedule, and
use recent experiences to extrapolate the Life Cycle
Cost (LCC) of a system.  By using ACEIT as an
example, we can examine these costs for a new system
by averaging the actual experience involved in buying
ma y existing systems.
Costs and Examples
The results of one study employing the ACEIT tool
demonstrate both the potentially low cost of military
Microsat systems and how far space system acquisition
has to go in reducing non-hardware costs.
The Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) awarded a
contract to the Universities Space Research
Association (USRA), which in turn contracted with
Space Dynamics Lab (SDL) of Utah State University,
to support the “Innovative Design, Low Cost
Nanosatellites” task.  The objective of the program,
called Advanced Space Technologies and Emerging
Concepts (ASTEC), was to determine the feasibility
and costs associated with the development and
manufacture of 100 Microsats to perform a reference
mission specified by AFRL with a cost goal of $1
million per satellite.  SDL aggressively pursued the
design using an innovative leading-edge Satellite
Development Approach (SDA).  The overall goal was
to develop new manufacturing and integrated life-
cycle development methodologies as well as
incorporate proven strategies into their SDA.
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The ASTEC study, based on mass production of
technologically advanced 40-kg Microsats with
rendezvous, inspection, and docking capabilities,
produced these results:
Hardware RDT&E cost: $43M
Total RDT&E:  $75M
Hardware Production: $26M
Total Production: $50M
These results are extremely impressive for a highly
capable system of 100 Microsats.  They show what
applying volume production and the latest Microsat
technology can do for spacecraft costs and capabilities.
Buying the Government Way
While the above figures show how economical
Microsats can be, they address only one component of
a satellite system - the hardware.   When the
government buys a space system, it adds numerous
costs for oversight, evaluation, etc.
In the RDT&E and Production phases, costs to the
Government other than the satellites consist of Launch;
Ground Command, Control, Communications &
Mission Equipment; Flight Support Operations &
Services; Storage; Systems Engineering/Program
Management; System Test & Evaluation; Training;
Data; Peculiar Support Equipment; Common Support
Equipment; Operational/Site Activation; Industrial
Facilities; Initial Spares and Repairs; Engineering
Change Orders/Engineering Change Proposals; and
Government Program Office. System Engineering/
Program Management (SEPM) includes systems
engineering and technical control as well as business
management of particular systems and programs.  The
cost labeled Government Program Office includes the
expense of the Government System Program Office
(SPO).  A SPO is the office of the Program Manager,
and the single point of contact with industry,
Government agencies, and others in the  System
Acquisition Process.
In the example just discussed, the total acquisition
costs were forecast at $125M.  This is a premium of
$75M over the initial costs of the hardware, arrived at
by using current DoD acquisition procedures as costed
by ACEIT based on historical examples and Cost
Estimating Relationships (CERs).  The magnitude of
the difference between hardware costs and total costs
demonstrates how important the Acquisition pillar of
the MAP is in reducing costs.
Another ANSER study, completed in 1997, examined
a complete force of Microsats and rapid-response
small launchers based on retired missile stages.  The
purchase included eight complete constellations (each
with seven UHF communications Microsats for
continuous connectivity), nine larger store-and-
forward communications Microsats, and 37 launch
vehicles (the extra vehicles were to allow for a future
generation of satellites in addition to those initially
purchased.)  All the satellites used were available off-
the-shelf from commercial vendors.  Cost analysis
yielded the following results:
Hardware RDT&E cost: $21M
To al RDT&E:  $45M
Hardware Production: $323M
Total Production: $450M
Other Factors
In addition, recent space system acquisition has rarely
gone as planned, so the actual costs are higher than the
projected ones.  In part, this is due to the increased
complexity of the desired systems, and in part to the
cumbersome system by which we purchase them.
Another problem is the number of competitors
involved in purchasing space systems.  In 1997, for the
follow-on to MILSTAR, the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) program, the Government
received only two proposals.  Today, if the DoD wants
a large, complex satellite, only Boeing/Hughes,
Lockheed-Martin, Space Systems Loral, and TRW
(among American companies) have the capability to
develop it.  Any concept involving Microsatellites
adds several other possible manufacturers, increasing
the prospects for competition and bring into the mix
organizations with a reputation for innovative low-cost
solutions.
As noted earlier, the increasing weight and complexity
of space systems has continuously driven up the cost
of acquiring them.  Some increase in acquisition cost
and schedule is expected any time a more complex
system is purchased, so we must look for the solution
in two areas: buying the least complex technology to
do the mission, and purchasing it in the simplest, most
affordable manner.
Example: An Early Military Microsat Program
At this point, we need to return once more to the
less ns of history.  We are not arguing that there were
“good old days” in which all space acquisition worked
smoothly.  The Air Force’s MIDAS satellite, designed
in a program which began in 1958 to detect missile
launches, was an example of a program subjected to
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subject to repeated cost and schedule increases.  The
1840-kg MIDAS, however, was a very large, complex
spacecraft for its time, one that pushed the state of the
art.
Contrast that experience to a system which, while
admittedly facing much lower technical hurdles, also
broke new ground for military space systems.  This
was the first signals intelligence satellite program,
publicly announced as a solar radiation satellite
program called SolRad.  In fact, these satellites were
also designed to intercept Soviet radar signals and
transmit them to ground stations for analysis.
Accordingly, the project had the classified name
Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB).
The SolRad/GRAB satellites (Figure 2)  were
proposed in 1958. They weighed 18 kg, required little
new technology, and were built mainly in-house by the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) using the spherical
"bus" from the NRL's Vanguard program.  Full
development began in August 1959.  Launch was
approved on 5 May 1960, and took place on 22 June.15
A timeline like this - nine months to build the
spacecraft and six weeks to integrate and launch the
payload - is unheard of in modern space systems.
America's first satellite, Explorer 1, with a science
payload simpler than the GRAB payloads, went from
approval to orbit in 84 days (most of the spacecraft
design work had been done ahead of the official start
date, but fabrication had not begun.).
Figure 2. The SolRad/GRAB satellite. (NRL)
The SolRad/GRAB experience is an early example of
what we are calling the MAP. The above-mentioned
IDSCP is another example.  Microsats are not the only
military space systems ever delivered on time and on
budget, but they have a much better record than larger
space systems.  Accordingly, there are lessons to be
learned in both the technology and acquisition sides.
Recently, NASA attempted something similar to the
MAP with its Faster, Better Cheaper (FBC) approach.
FBC’s record has been good with Earth orbiting
science craft, less so with planetary probes.  A 1999
Aerospace Corporation analysis showed that, while
FBC missions had a higher failure rate than traditional
large spacecraft, the magnitude of the large-program
failures was so much greater that the FBC approach
worked out to be 57 percent more cost-efficient, at
l ast for NASA science missions.16 After the failure of
two Mars missions, NASA appointed the Young
Commission to examine the FBC approach.  The
Commission found the approach sound but said
schedules and budgets had been pushed too hard,
resulting in the skipping of tests and other unwise
shortcuts.17  The Commission's recommendations
stressed the importance of single-interface
management structures and thorough testing programs
- both, it should be noted, far easier to achieve with
smal  spacecraft than with very complex ones.
The Microsat Acquisition Paradigm
Distilling the lessons of FBC’s successes and failures,
plus the records of military space programs large and
small, we have developed the MAP.  We will now
look in depth at each of the MAP's three pillars:
Requirements, Technology, and Acquisition.
Requirements
Understanding the military’s space requirements is the
foundation of this approach.  In the past, proponents of
Microsats have sometimes approached DoD with an
argument like, "Look how much better this technology
is."  Whether they were correct or not is immaterial.
DoD starts with an extensive requirements generation
and validation process, and any effort to interest DoD
in new technology must proceed from an analysis of
those requirements.
Such an analysis was funded by Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC) and performed by ANSER in
1999.  The findings were that Microsats appeared to be
a cost-effective solution - in some cases the preferred
solution - to requirements in:
· Space control (detecting, inspecting, and, if
necessary, countering spacecraft on orbit).
Microsats were the preferred low-cost solution for
close inspection and related missions.
· Space force enhancement (providing weather,
communications, and other services to terrestrial
forces).  Microsats showed promise as part of the
space force mix in all areas except high-resolution
imagery.
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· Space support (launch, on-orbit serving, and orbit
transfer).  Microsats could provide a near-term
servicing capability and would greatly aid the
launch and transfer capabilities by keeping down
the size of the spacecraft being launched or
relocated.18
Technology
The second pillar is the ability to correlate the
requirements to the current and projected state of
Microsat technology and explain what space functions
can be accomplished with Microsats.  Microsats also
enable the use of smaller, cheaper, more responsive
launch vehicles, and there are breakthrough
developments possible in this field as well.
The above-mentioned Microsat study done for AFSPC
in 1999 confirmed that, given the improvements in
microelectronics and other technologies, there was no
mission except high-resolution Earth imaging which
could NOT be performed with Microsats.19  This is not
to say that all missions should be turned over to
Microsats. High-volume communications, for instance,
would require so many Microsats that the savings over
MILSTAR achieved by using cheaper spacecraft
would be wiped out by the launch requirements.  (The
tradeoffs involved may  still be worthy of proper
examination, since the Microsats offer survivability,
upgradeability, and other advantages.)
Redundancy is a concern often voiced about using
Microsatellites.  Microsats are often single-string
designs with minimal redundant components.  The
point made by Microsat proponents is that Microsats
rely mainly on a spacecraft-level redundancy as
opposed to component-level redundancy.  While many
of today's Air Force weapon systems, such as cruise
missiles and smart bombs, have as much redundancy
as possible given their size and weight limits, the key
characteristic of such devices is that they are simple
enough and affordable enough to manufacture in
quantity.  If a weapon like these fails, another one is
launched at the same target.20  There is no reason the
same logic should not apply to satellites. (It is relevant
to note that  these types of expendable, mass-produced
weapons are often heavier and more complex than
Microsats.)
Professor Wiley Larson, in the book Reducing Space
Mission Costs, tates the logic of simplicity this way:
"Basically, there is less that can go wrong on a
small spacecraft.  When we add physical
redundancy...we also add the interconnects and
the logic for selecting the components to be
used.  All of this increases the complexity and,
therefore, reduces somewhat the reliability
nhancement that was intended. "21
Larson's point about the advantage of using the
simplest possible design is not a new concept.  When
asked by a Congressional panel in 1962 how to
improve reliability and lower costs of spacecraft,
George Trimble, then vice president of the Martin
Company (now part of Lockheed-Martin), put it this
way:
"Complexity inherently lowers system
reliability simply because there are more
things that can go wrong.  The probability of
failure increases almost directly with the
number of components.  The contractor,
therefore, must design reliability into his
product beginning at the conceptual stage by
using his engineering ingenuity and
resourcefulness to achieve the highest degree
of simplification possible.  In addition to
increasingly reliability and thereby reducing
costs, simplification results in substantial
co ollary savings in such areas as training,
maintenance, and basing.  It is our feeling,
t refore, that in evaluating future space
systems, major emphasis should be given to
basic design simplicity."22
It should be noted that simplicity does not mean
reliance on old technology.  An integrated circuit chip
replaces hundreds or thousands of earlier-generation
electronic components, with a commensurate increase
in reliability.
The spacecraft-level redundancy approach has one
st mbling block when applied to space - the current
high cost of launch.  If even a small launcher costs
well over $10M, it doesn't matter if the payloads are
cheap.  Widespread adoption of the MAP requires that
Microsat launch costs be lowered.
There are short- and long-term approaches to this
problem being pursued.  The  short-term approach is
cheaper expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).  The
Microcosm Sprite, a simplified liquid-fuel vehicle
being designed with AFRL support will cost under
$2M to launch 200 kg into orbit.  Another AFRL
concept, a minimal launch vehicle launched from an F-
15 aircraft, will cost as little as $1M for each 40-kg
payload orbited, if the number produced is high
enough.  Longer-term approaches under study include
reusable launchers, such as the Space Maneuver
Vehicle (SMV).
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Acquisition
Finally, historical examples, as well as studies for
AFSPC and AFRL, demonstrate that streamlined, cost-
effective acquisition is a reality for Microsats, enabling
savings in time and money compared to the acquisition
system used for traditional space systems.
Integrating The MAP
If some space functions can be undertaken by low-cost
Microsats or Microsat constellations, several
advantages can be applied to space system acquisition.
These include:
Mass production
Space systems are traditionally unique.  Even the GPS
satellites, built in “blocks,” are all at least slightly
different from one another.  True mass production of
spacecraft has only been applied in a few cases, such
as Globalstar’s 72 satellites or Orbcomm’s 36.
Reduced oversight
A simpler system requires less oversight per unit
produced.  The reams of government and contractor
experts (normally including contractors hired to check
other contractors) who examine every MILSTAR
satellite do not similarly scrutinize every cruise
missile.  That is not only because of the number
produced, but because of the relative simplicity of the
system.  It's also because, thanks to the purchase of
backup units, not every cruise missile needs to operate
with 100 percent reliability.
Allowance for reasonable failures
Failure of a largesat such as MILSTAR represents a
huge investment in the satellite, launch vehicle, launch
campaign costs, etc.  Such systems are inspected and
tested exhaustively – and expensively – because they
cannot be allowed to fail.  When they do, significant
portions of the military’s satellite capability are lost.
A related advantage is the opportunity to cancel
unpromising programs.  The Aerospace study of FBC
cited earlier commented, "The flexibility provided by
the ability to cancel programs in trouble...would have
been very difficult to achieve with traditional programs
due to the sheer magnitude of the sunk costs of these
programs."23
Reliance on larger numbers of small satellites spreads
out the risk.  It may take dozens of Microsats to equal,
say, the capacity of a UFO.  They may cost more, in
total, than the largesat they replace.  If the UFO fails,
however, 100 percent of the capability is lost.  If three
of the Microsats fail, a few percent of the capability
has been lost.  The ability to accept some risk allows
us o further cut the overhead costs of test and
inspection.
Increased contractor base
As mentioned earlier, the number of American
companies serving as prime contractor for large
satelli es has been cut to four - Boeing (including
Hughes), Lockheed-Martin, TRW, and Space Systems
Loral.  A reduction in the number of vendors most
often means a reduction in competition, with a
commensurate increase in price and decrease in
innovation.  If smaller satellites are considered as
solutions, numerous additional  vendors are available.
These include established aerospace companies like
Ball, relative newcomers such as Spectrum Astro,
AeroAstro, and SpaceDev, and university-affiliated
programs including the Space Dynamics Laboratory,
One Stop Satellite Solutions, and others.   Many of
these organizations have gained reputations for
innovative, low-cost designs with high success rates -
Ball, for example, has built over thirty spacecraft with
a zero failure rate. OSC's novel Orbcomm
communications satellites have proven nearly as
reliable.
Applying Microsat Lessons
An April 2000 workshop that brought together
executives from some of the leading Microsat
development organizations (commercial and
university-based) produced consensus on some
guidelines for successful low-cost spacecraft
development programs.  While these are derived from
Microsat examples, they apply to most spacecraft
programs.24
· Focus on the mission.  Avoid expanding the
mission during development or adding secondary
functions.  Secondary missions, if truly important,
can be addressed with their own dedicated
Microsats.
· Small teams.  Spacecraft should be built by
integrated, cross-functional teams where each
p rson has a good understanding of the entire
spacecraft and its mission.
· U  commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts with
proper testing.  Overreliance on milspec or space-
qualified parts adds weight, prevents use of the
most current technology,  and adds to parts count,
reducing reliability, all with no proven benefits.
Bille 10 14th Annual USU Conference on Small Satellites
· Accept risk.  Attempts to avoid all risk by adding
redundancy, sticking to space-qualified parts, etc.
add high cost with little return.
· Stick to the schedule.  Schedule and cost are
closely related.  It's cheaper to spend money to
keep the program on schedule than it is to extend
the schedule.
· Incentivize the contractor.  Moving to less
expensive Microsats creates room to fund contract
incentives which reward innovative, low-cost, on-
schedule designs with acceptable performance
capabilities.
A second Aerospace Corporation study, an analysis of
the failures in NASA's FBC programs completed in
May 2000, reported that the failure was most likely
when high complexity was combined with a short
development timeline.  There was no direct correlation
between success and cost.  Mismanagement and
miscommunication were cited as major contributors to
failure as well.25  The Aerospace analysis indicates
that, if the emphasis on schedule recommended by the
workshop participants is to be followed, the emphasis
on keeping the spacecraft simple needs to be given
equal weight.
A final example to mention is the Amateur Radio
Satellite Corporation (AMSAT) which makes full use
of all the approaches just mentioned and uses not just
COTS parts, but scrounged and donated parts. (One
AMSAT spacecraft used a bus that was never intended
to be flight hardware, but was built as a mock-up.  It
worked.26)  AMSAT spacecraft, ranging from a tiny 5-
kg radio beacon to 140-kg, three-axis-stabilized
communications satellites, to date include over 40
missions with only one on-orbit failure.27
Recommendations
Resting on the  three pillars described above, the MAP
approach would recommend the following features in
acquiring new space systems.
· Research the history.  Space systems are often
purchased with no knowledge of what historical
examples may be relevant.  For example, it is
often assumed that the approach embodied by
large satellites is the best way to perform a
mission without knowing whether that mission has
ever been done with small satellites.  High-
resolution imagery is the ONLY current mission
for which small-satellite technology has never
been developed.
· Use the smallest, simplest spacecraft that will
perform the mission.  In many cases, this means
accepting an 80 percent solution – not because
100 percent isn’t possible, but because pursuing
he 100 percent goal would add years to the
schedule and many millions to the cost.
· Do not automatically assume that contracting out
he major part of development and even
production is always the best way to go.  In-house
development has sometimes, as in the case of
SolRad/GRAB, proved to be fast and efficient.
The Total Picture
The apparent cost of any system – even the LCC –
does not give the entire picture of that system’s ripple
effects on military organizations, competing priorities,
and other affected areas.  For example, the increased
int rest in Microsats by non-DoD organizations, such
as NASA, universities, and private industry, means a
shift to the MAP would also facilitate industrial base
mai tenance and civil-military integration.
Conclusions
While not all DoD space missions can transition to
Microsats, enough of them can to make the MAP the
dominant model for future space acquisitions.  Many
lessons of the MAP can be applied to larger space
systems as well.
Due to the volatile state of the DoD space budget,
age cies guiding Microsat programs must do their jobs
well.  Any program which is controversial, as
Microsats often are, must be solidly linked to
requirements, satisfy a clear need, and contribute to the
sponsoring command's vision for space capabilities.
Because Microsats make easy targets when money is
needed to fund cost overruns on larger, "more
important" space systems, Microsat program managers
must follow the MAP very carefully.  The technology
being pursued must be sound, the applicable
requirements must be satisfied well, and a feasible,
coherent, attainable acquisition plan must be in place.
The DoD approach to space is not merely inefficient.
It is broken.  A space system delivered on time and on
budget is virtually unheard of.  Needed capabilities slip
for years because of the desire to maximize each
spacecraft’s functions, test it to (sometimes beyond)
the point of damage, and ensure it has the latest
technology.
The MAP offers a way out – not a cure-all, but
certainly a major leap forward.  Buying smaller,
distributed systems and buying them efficiently means
the military will have needed space systems as soon as
possible for reasonable prices.  Implementing the MAP
requires the shattering of long-established paradigms
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and, quite possibly, the restructuring or elimination of
some elements of the military space acquisition
system.  It will require changes in the government-
contractor relationship, with the government playing a
greater role, in some cases, in R&D, while playing a
smaller role in production of a system.  Implementing
the MAP will involve some difficulty, and possibly
some risk.  Not implementing keeps us on today’s path
– a totally unacceptable road to never-ending cost and
schedule creep.
DISCLAIMER : Opinions in this paper are solely
those of the authors.  This paper does not represent any
type of official position, plan, or policy of the U.S. Air
Force, the Department of Defense, any agency of the
U.S. government, Analytic Services Inc. (ANSER),
SenCom, or any other corporation.
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